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Abstract 
 
The 2007 financial crisis revealed how excessive bank risk threatens financial system 
stability. This paper studies two aspects of the risk-taking incentives of banks– CEO 
compensation and capital. The vega of a bank executive’s equity compensation measures how 
compensation changes relative to the banks’ stock volatility. If CEO compensation vega is high, 
I expect the CEO to take more risk in areas where he exercises control. Conversely, if regulators 
demand that banks invest their own capital to encourage conservative behavior, then I expect 
risk-taking to be lower. This paper confirms that higher vega and lower capital ratios are 
associated with more real estate lending by bank holding companies in the U.S. between 2000 
and 2014. The negative relation between capital ratios and real estate lending exists in almost all 
subsamples. However, the positive relation between vega and real estate lending is only 
significant among small well-capitalized banks, and after the financial crisis. 
 
 
Keywords: Executive compensation, Vega, Capital ratio, Real estate loans 
JEL Classification: G21, G31, G32, J33 
 
 
3 
1 Introduction  
The 2007 financial crisis caused damages to the U.S. economy second only to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The crisis grew from the U.S. housing boom which began to burst in 
2006. However, the real estate growth was only possible because banks made substantial 
investments in real estate. After the crisis, regulators and the public were concerned about 
excessive risk-taking by banks and searched for evidence of misaligned risk incentives. 
Executive compensation and capital requirements are at the center of these discussions. 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank) in 2010. One of the centerpieces of Dodd-Frank is Section 956 which requires 
banking authorities to draft regulations to restrict executive compensation practices that 
encourage risk-taking. It is well known that managerial compensation contracts influence their 
risk-taking and capital accumulation incentives (e.g., Bennett, Gopalan and Thakor (2016)). 
Several studies use the CEO’s equity compensation vega (hereafter vega) as a proxy for the 
bank’s incentive to increase volatility (Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; 
Hayes et al., 2012). Vega measures the risk-taking incentives of the manager as the sensitivity of 
the manager’s stock options to the firm’s stock return volatility. An increase in the firm’s 
volatility increases equity value by reducing debt value (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 
1974). Therefore, I expect vega to be positively correlated with the risk of bank assets. This 
prediction is consistent with empirical work, such as Guay (1999), that generally finds a positive 
association between vega and stock return volatility, suggesting that vega encourages managerial 
risk-taking. Typically, equity-based compensation on one hand, can encourage managers to work 
hard, but on the other hand, it can affect their attitude towards project risk, and thus, lead to too 
little risk-taking (Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992). 
Theories of bank capital structure do not agree on whether high bank leverage is efficient 
and necessary. Capital requirements are based upon the rationale that banks will take too much 
risk if they are highly leveraged. Thakor (2014) highlighted the contemporary thinking on capital 
structures. Thakor (2014) states that “ bank capital structures are optimally chosen in 
equilibrium, so capital requirements that distort leverage choices away from these (private) 
optima will generate costs that we should try to avoid, or at least balance against the benefits of 
enhanced stability that come with higher capital.” Therefore, capital requirements, especially 
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risk-based ones, affect the risk taking of banks indirectly.2 For example, Mehran and Thakor 
(2011) and Hanson et al., (2011) provide estimates of the potential effects of higher capital 
requirements on bank lending, find that higher-capital banks are associated with more lending 
and liquidity creation, and higher bank values. Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that bank 
capital affects bank risk.3 They provide empirical evidence that commercial banks with higher 
capital have a greater capability of surviving a financial crisis, and that small banks with higher 
capital are more likely to survive during normal times as well. Therefore, I expect banks with 
more capital to have less risky assets.   
Based on the arguments above, this paper tests the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Higher bank CEO vega is associated with higher real estate lending. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Higher bank capital ratios are associated with lower real estate lending.  
To test these hypotheses, I regress a bank’s real estate loans relative to total assets against 
the capital ratio (either Tier 1 or risk-based) and the CEO’s compensation vega. Since real estate 
lending is risky, I use it as a proxy for risk taking by banks. I include CEO compensation, bank 
asset, and financial characteristics as control variables in addition to year fixed effects. Using a 
sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 2000 to 2014, I find empirical evidence 
that is consistent with both hypotheses developed above. There is a significantly positive relation 
between CEO vega and real estate lending which holds for all subsamples. However, vega is 
only significant among small banks, banks with low market-to-book ratios, and during the post-
crisis subsample (years 2010-2014). The relation between bank capital ratios and real estate 
lending is significantly negative. These results support regulating bank CEO compensation and 
capital to curtail bank risk. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and the contribution of 
this paper. Section 3 describes the data, defines variables, and provides summary statistics. 
Section 4 presents detailed empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Besides banks capital and risk, past research has also provided evidence on the relation between managerial equity-
based incentives and risk choices that benefited managers but not shareholders (Bhattacharyya, S., & Purnanandam, 
2011). 
3 Other determinants of bank risk include the bank’s loan standards (Bushman and Williams, 2012) and 
securitization (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).  
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2 Literature Review 
This paper is related to the extensive empirical finance literature on risk-taking incentives, 
executive compensation, and bank capital structure. Numerous studies provide evidence 
consistent with a causal effect of executives' contractual incentives on their risk taking. In that 
sense, this paper neither argues for nor against causality between risk-taking incentives and 
executive compensation. Rather, it is to show the relationship between a specific type of risks 
banks take (in real estate lending) and bank executives' risk-taking incentives provided by vega 
in their compensation contracts. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) examine the causal links 
between investments, leverage, and diversification in CEO compensation incentives, find that the 
direction of causality runs both ways.  Therefore, equity-based compensation does not 
necessarily lead to increased risk-taking since it can increase the sensitivity of the manager’s 
portfolio to firm stock price movements (Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004). However, Haugen and 
Senbet (1981) and Smith and Stulz (1985) find that when a stock’s volatility increases the value 
of options on the stock rise. Reitman (1993) shows that the nonlinearity of executive stock 
options enhances stock returns compared to linear compensation contracts. A few papers 
published in the accounting literature have provided an agency-based conceptual framework of 
business unit manager compensation in diversified firms (e.g., Bushman et al., 1995). The 
evidence from Bushman et al. (1995) document that business unit managers are rewarded based 
on their own unit’s performance and aggregate corporate performance. Thus, Financial measures 
have been criticized for being too historical and backward-looking, for encouraging 
dysfunctional behaviors. In this sense, accounting-based measures (ROA/ROE) are often 
sensitive to manipulation, the significant amount of corporate scandals, due to accounting fraud, 
illustrates this sensitivity (Pérez-González, 2006).  
Moreover, this paper is related to academic literature deals with managerial equity-based 
incentives and the corresponding pay-risk sensitivities on the investment strategy, and 
performance, specifically in the context of the financial crisis. First, this paper follows the prior 
empirical risk-taking literature and focuses on bank executives' equity portfolio (i.e., stock and 
option) holdings, which account for the vast majority of their monetary wealth and incentives 
(Core and Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002). Second, managerial compensation helps risk-
neutral shareholders motivate risk-averse managers. Laeven and Levine (2009) find bank risk 
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taking varies positively with shareholders’ power compared to bank directors. Chen et al. (2006) 
document a positive relation between the value of bank managers' options and multiple measures 
of bank risk, including total, systematic, and idiosyncratic stock return volatility and interest rate 
risk. Lastly, number of bank executive compensation papers study how managerial compensation 
and ownership affected bank performance during the crisis (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Keys 
et al., 2009; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). DeYoung et al. (2013) find that the risk-taking 
incentives implicit in executive compensation explain CEOs pre-crisis decision to shift bank 
business models from traditional originate-to-hold towards originate-to-distribute model. I 
contribute to these literatures by documenting a positive association between compensation vega 
and the bank’s real estate investments. Moreover, I find that the association between vega and 
real estate lending is only significant for small well-capitalized banks and after the 2007-09 
financial crisis. 
This paper is also related to the work studying how bank capital affects risk taking. 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that better capitalized banks are more likely to survive banking 
crises. Berger & Bouwman (2013) provide empirical evidence that commercial banks with 
higher capital have a greater capability of surviving a financial crisis and that small banks with 
higher capital are also more likely to survive during normal times. Others have looked for natural 
experiments that have resulted in an exogenous shock to bank capital (Rice and Rose, 2016). 
Some empirical evidence that the abundant availability of liquidity prior to the recent crisis may 
have contributed to the crisis by inducing banks to lower their credit standards has recently been 
provided by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012). Among the reasons for a revised outlook cited by the 
rating agency were the increased risk of U.S. banks and a higher probability of another bailout. 
Thakor, (1996), underscore the importance of bank capital for credit origination. Thakor (2005) 
shows that excessive risk-taking and greater bank liquidity creation may occur off the balance 
sheet during economic booms, as banks shy away from exercising material adverse change 
clauses due to reputational concerns during such times. Cornett et al., (2011) find that US banks 
with more exposure to liquidity risk experienced less loan growth during the crisis. Gambacorta 
and Marques-Ibanez (2011) and Cornett et al. (2011) recognize the effects of bank capital during 
crises on loan growth. A few studies have applied the information contained in the bank lending 
to study the impact on loan growth, financing conditions more generally and on economic 
activity (see e.g.; Bayoumi and Melander, 2008). Some papers have found that tight credit 
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conditions may constrain consumption and investment expenditures (Bayoumi and Mellander, 
2008). Therefore, I expect bank executives to select riskier portfolios when their incentives are 
aligned with bank shareholders. I find that higher capital ratios are associated with less real estate 
lending.4 
 
3 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1  Data and Sample Construction 
This paper uses a sample of U.S. bank holding companies with publicly traded stocks. I use 
quarterly data from Call Reports (FRY-9 reports) from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth 
quarter of 2014 from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). From the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, I collect bank stock data and a crosswalk that links stock and call report 
data.5 I obtain compensation data for publicly listed BHCs from ExecuComp, CRSP, and 
Compustat to calculate vega and other relevant measures. ExecuComp used to obtain 
compensation data that consisted of the executives at U.S. publicly listed firms and complement 
the compensation data with stock returns from CRSP and firm financial data from Compustat. 
Besides, I identify whether a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is present at the bank who may restrain 
the risk-taking tendencies of executives and traders.6 Institutional ownership data is from 
Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings – s34 File. Sample subsets based on only CEOs 
data in ExecuComp. 
To construct the sample, I first identifying publicly listed BHCs in the U.S. that are 
available in Call Reports from 2000 to 2014. I merge the Call Reports data with ExecuComp and 
Compustat to extract information on bank executives, assets, and other financial information. 
The resulting final sample consists of 1,659 distinct bank CEO-years.  
 
4 In this paper I find lower investment in real estate loans. But I do not find that the loans not taken were of higher 
risk.  
5 The FRB Chicago maintains a Bank Holding Companies Database, which collects financial data from the FRY-9 
reports. The Federal Reserve crosswalk between stock PERCO and call report RSSD identifiers is available at 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.htm. Accessed on October 16, 2019, this table 
includes 1,428 PERMCO/RSSD links as of 2017. 
6 Using ExecuComp data and following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), I mark that a CRO is present at a bank if one of 
the bank executives in ExecuComp has a title (TITLE or TITLEANN variable) of “Chief Risk Officer,” “Chief Risk 
Officer and Executive,” “Chief Credit Officer,” “Chief Lending Officer,” or “CFO.” The reason to include the CFO 
is because BHCs that do not have a designated CRO most likely have a CFO in charge of risk management. See also 
Keys et al. (2009) for a similar measure to capture the relative power of the CFO within the bank. The BHCs 10-K 
statement does not require reporting of the presence of a CRO.  
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3.2  Vega Calculation 
I calculate the stock option value, its sensitivity to stock price (delta), and its sensitivity to stock 
return volatility (vega) based on Black-Scholes (1973) modified to account for dividend payouts 
by Merton (1973). I follow Core and Guay (2002) and apply the Black-Scholes-Merton option 
valuation model that incorporates dividends to calculate the following three variables: 
 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑆𝑒−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑋𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2) 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 =
∆(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
∆(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
∗
𝑆
100
= 𝑒−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) 
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 =
∆(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
∆(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
∗ 0.01 = 𝑒−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁′(𝑑1) ∗ 𝑆 ∗ √𝑇 ∗ 0.01 
 
where 
𝑑1 =
ln(𝑆 𝑋⁄ )+(𝑟−𝑑+𝜎2 2⁄ )𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇 
 
In the equations above, 𝑆 is the underlying stock price, 𝑋 is the exercise price of the call 
option, 𝜎 is the annualized stock volatility during the maturity period of the option, 𝑟 is the 
natural logarithm of the risk-free interest rate plus one (i.e., continuously compounded risk-free 
rate), 𝑇 is the time to maturity of the option measured in years, and 𝑑 is the natural logarithm of 
the anticipated annual dividend yield plus one (i.e. continuous dividend yield). 𝑁 is the 
cumulative probability function for the standard normal distribution, and 𝑁′ is the standard 
normal density function. 
Coles et al. (2006) provide their delta and vega estimates and the SAS program for data 
replication.7 I follow their approach exactly to calculate delta and vega of vested and unvested 
shares and options. Then I sum delta and vega of all vested and unvested options for each 
 
7 Coles et al. (2006) have fully documented their approach and code at https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/ 
(accessed on October 16, 2019). Before 2006, ExecuComp does not provide data XXXX needed to calculate the 
option’s delta and vega. Therefore, I follow Coles et al. (2006) to use the approximation of proposed by Core and 
Guay (2002). 
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executive year to obtain delta and vega of the option portfolio without adjusting for the maturity 
of the options.8 
I exclude unearned compensation from the executive compensation package. An 
executive has unearned awards when future vesting is contingent or accelerated based on 
achieving a stock price or accounting hurdle. ExecuComp does not provide the data to calculate 
values for these awards. Coles et al. (2006) point out that “these unearned shares or options will 
be classified as either shares or options when they are earned, and, if these grants are still held by 
the executive as of the end of the year, they will be included in the delta and vega calculation at 
that point.” Ignoring the unearned awards underestimates the true delta and vega of the 
executive’s compensation package. 
I use ExecuComp’s estimate of stock volatility winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
ExecuComp requires data for at least 12 months of returns and uses the annualized standard 
deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal 
period. I use the annual constant maturity treasury yields from the Federal Reserve as the risk-
free rate.9 Figure 1 displays the average bank CEO vega from 2000 to 2014. Vega changed 
considerably over time. The lowest average vega occurs in 2009 which is likely an outcome of 
the financial crisis. 
 
3.3  Other Key Variables 
Loans secured by residential, commercial construction, land development, and other land are 
reported in FR Y-9C. They exclude mortgage-backed securities. I divide real estate loans by total 
assets as a proxy for bank risk-taking. Figure 2 displays average bank real estate lending from 
the first quarter in 2000 to the fourth quarter in 2014. During this period, the average ratio of real 
estate loans to total assets increased from 38% to 43%. I follow Huizinga and Laeven (2012) and 
calculate Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are calculated as Tier 1 and risk-based capital 
divided by total risk-weighted assets, respectively.  
 I also use total bank assets, total loans as a ratio to total assets, non-real estate loans as a 
ratio to total assets, real loan growth rate, market-to-book ratio of equity, book and market 
 
8 ExecuComp has a 70% haircut on time to maturity for (pre-2006) calculation of Black-Scholes value. Coles et al. 
(2006) do not appear to make this assumption. 
9 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm#fn11 (accessed on October 16, 2019). 
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leverage ratios, loan loss provisions, net loan charge-offs, institutional ownership, and 
annualized stock return and volatility. For bank CEOs, I include their cash and total 
compensation as well as tenure with the bank. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers. See Appendix A for a complete list of variables and 
their definitions and Appendix B for all the BHCs included in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.4  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of CEO compensation, bank asset, and financial 
characteristics (observed at the bank CEO-year level). The average bank CEO earns total 
compensation of $4.3 million a year where the cash compensation from base salary and bonus is 
about $1.5 million. The average delta and vega of the CEO’s equity compensation are $493,000 
and $123,000, respectively. Delta means that a CEO’s wealth increases by $493,000 on average 
if their banks’ stock price increase by 1%. Vega means that an increase of 1% in stock volatility 
leads to an increase of $123,000 in CEO wealth on average. The average tenure of bank CEOs is 
6.6 years. Roughly two-thirds of banks have a CRO or C-level executive responsible for risk 
management.  
The average BHC in my sample has total assets of $121 billion, of which 58.4% are 
loans, 37.8% are real estate loans, and 20.6% are non-real estate loans. Tier 1 capital (resp. risk-
based capital) accounts for 9.1% (resp. 15.3%) of risk-weighted assets. The mean annualized 
stock return is 2.7%, and the mean annualized stock volatility is 18%.  
Table 2 reports Pearson’s pairwise correlation between banks’ lending exposures (real 
estate and non-real estate) and losses measured by loan loss provisions and net loan charge offs 
as percentages of total loans. Column (1) shows that real estate loans as a ratio to total assets 
have a statistically significant and positive correlation (0.08-0.09) with both loan loss provisions 
and net loan charge-offs at the 5% level. In contrast, non-real estate loans do not have a 
significant correlation with either loan loss provisions or net charge offs. The positive correlation 
between real estate lending and loan losses suggests that real estate loans are riskier than non-
real estate loans. 
 
4 Empirical Finding 
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4.1  Regression Specification 
I test how CEO compensation vega and bank capital are associated with a bank’s real estate 
lending according to the regression equation below. The dependent variable is bank i’s real estate 
loans (measured relative to total assets) at time t. There are two independent variables of interest: 
the vega and capital ratio of bank i at time t–1. The capital ratio is either the Tier 1 capital ratio 
or the risk-based capital ratio. Vega and capital ratio are lagged, this may shed some light on 
causality, even though, they do not completely remove the endogeneity issue associated with 
these two independent variables. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑗=1
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
Based on Coles et al. (2006), I include institutional ownership, CEO cash compensation, 
CEO delta, and CEO tenure in the regressions to control for governance, ownership, and CEO’s 
level of risk aversion. Besides to include the presence of a CRO (or a similar position).  
Guay (1999) argues that CEOs with higher cash compensation can invest outside the firm 
to diversify their personal portfolio which allows them to take larger risks with the firm they 
control. Consistent with the existing literature, I also control for a number of bank asset and 
financial characteristics, including the natural logarithm of total assets, total loans as a ratio to 
total assets, the market-to-book ratio of equity, and stock volatility. All control variables are 
lagged. 
 
4.2  Main Regression Results 
Table 3 reports the main regression results relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and 
capital ratio. I use four slightly different regression specifications in Table 3. In columns (1) and 
(3) I use the Tier 1 capital ratio while in columns (2) and (4) I use the risk-based capital ratio. 
Year fixed effects are not included in columns (1) and (2) but included in columns (3) and (4). 
Across all four regression specifications, the coefficient of vega is significantly positive 
at the 10% level. This indicates that a bank’s investments in real estate loans increase with its 
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CEO vega. The capital ratio coefficient, measured by Tier 1 or risk-adjusted capital, is always 
negative and significant at the 1% level. So, a bank with higher capital invests less in real estate 
loans. These results are consistent with my hypotheses10. 
Thus far, I have established (1) the positive relation between CEO vega and real estate 
lending, and (2) the negative relation between capital and real estate lending. To further support 
the validity of these results, I estimate the regressions from Table 3 with non-real estate loans11 
as the dependent variable. Table 4 shows that the coefficient on vega is always insignificant. The 
capital ratio coefficient is only significant when the risk-based capital ratio is used and is 55% 
smaller than Table 3. So, compensation vega and capital ratios are more closely related to real 
estate lending.  
Table 6 reports the subsample regression results for banks with low and high capital 
ratios. The positive relation between vega and real estate loans is significant at the 5-10% level 
among banks with high capital ratios in three of four regression specifications that use median 
Tier 1 capital ratio (Panel A) and two of four regression specifications that use the median risk-
based capital ratio (Panel B). However, the vega coefficient is never significant among banks 
with low capital ratios. The negative relation between capital ratios and real estate lending is 
significant in almost all regressions at the 1-10% level for both banks with low capital ratios and 
banks with high capital ratios. 
Table 7 reports the subsample regression results for small and large banks. The positive 
relation between vega and real estate loans is significant at the 10% level among small banks in 
three of four regression specifications, but it is insignificant among large banks in all regressions. 
The relation between capital ratios and real estate loans is significantly negative in almost all 
regressions at the 1% level for both small and large banks. So higher capital ratios are 
consistently associated with less real estate lending, but the relation between vega and real estate 
lending is concentrated among small banks. 
Table 8 reports the subsample regression results for banks with low and high market-to-
book ratios. The positive relation between vega and real estate loans is uniformly significant at 
the 5-10% level among banks with low market-to-book ratios but it is never significant for banks 
 
10 Also, noteworthy that large banks may originate a large number of real estate secured loans. However, small 
banks are more likely to hold these loans on their balance sheet instead of securitizing them. 
11 The variable “non-real estate loans” is the difference between total loans and real estate loans, measured as a ratio 
to total assets. 
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with high market-to-book ratios. The negative relation between capital ratios and real estate 
loans is strongly significant in all regressions at the 1% level among banks with both low and 
high market-to-book ratios. While capital ratios can be adopted as a policy tool to affect real 
estate lending among all banks, the effect of vega seems concentrated only among banks with 
low market-to-book ratios. 
Table 9 reports the subsample regression results for banks with low and high stock 
volatility. The negative relation between capital ratios and real estate loans is significant at the 
1% level among banks with high stock volatility in all regressions and for low stock volatility 
banks in two regressions. Vega has a significantly positive relation with real estate loans at the 
5% level only among banks whose stock volatility is high.  
Table 5 reports summary statistics by subsample on key CEO compensation, bank asset 
and financial characteristics to provide profiles of these subsamples. Table 5 shows that banks 
with above median capital ratios have lower real loan growth rates.12 Banks with high Tier 1 
capital ratios have an average of 37.3% real loan growth rate while it is only 8.3% among banks 
with low Tier 1 capital ratios. Similarly, the contrast is 31.9% versus 15.4% in real loan growth 
rate between banks with high and low risk-based capital ratios. A high loan growth rate may 
indicate lower loan standards and a higher percentage of future nonperforming loans (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Espinoza and Prasad (2010), and Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas 
(2010)). So the significant relation between vega and real estate lending stems primarily from 
small and well-capitalized banks that are expanding quickly. Likewise, Table 5 shows that small 
banks make more real estate loans (45.1% vs. 30.4%). Meanwhile at small banks the majority of 
the growth in broader money supply is going to come from credit creation via new loans made 
by banks.13 Given that small banks tend to be better capitalized, the results of this section 
complement the results state above that the significant relation between vega and real estate 
lending is concentrated among small and well-capitalized banks. Furthermore, Table 5 shows 
that banks with low market-to-book ratios have an average of 49.6% real loan growth rate 
compared to 1.6% among high market-to-book banks. Banks with low market-to-book ratios also 
 
12 The claim is that a higher loan growth rate in the banking industry usually drove by bank size. The low 
capitalization banks are vastly larger. It is hard for a large bank to grow quickly. 
13 We should also recognize that for part of time period there may be a capital requirement surcharge for large 
banks. So size partially determines the capitalization due to regulation. 
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invest more in real estate loans (40.3% versus 35.2%). So, the significant relation between vega 
and real estate lending stems from banks with low market-to-book ratios which tend to focus on 
real estate lending and are growing quickly. Additionally, Table 5 shows that among banks with 
higher stock volatility, CEO compensation tends to have higher vega, delta, cash and total 
compensation, banks are on average smaller, invest more of their assets into loans, in particular 
real estate loans, and report higher loan loss provisions and net loan charge-offs. Higher average 
stock returns (5% vs. 0.4%) compensate investors for the risk of high-volatility banks. 
The results in Table 5 and in Tables 6 through Table 9 split the sample into bank-years above 
and below the median capital ratios, total assets, market-to-book ratio, and stock volatility. This 
allows me to investigate when the relationships of vega and capital to real estate lending are 
stronger. I find that vega is significantly associated with real estate lending primarily for small 
banks that are well capitalized. These banks tend to focus on real estate lending and have rapid 
loan growth. 
Lastly, I also study sample periods before, during, and after the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
Table 10 divides the sample into three periods: 1) before the 2007-09 financial crisis (years 
2000-2006), 2) during the crisis (years 2007-2009), and 3) after the crisis (years 2010-2014). 
Since the crisis, bank executive compensation has been criticized for providing incentives for 
excessive risk taking. However, regression results for the subsample periods show that high vega 
is not associated with high real estate loans before or during the crisis. Instead, the relationship 
between vega and real estate loans is significantly positive at the 5-10% level only after the crisis 
(Panel A and Panel B). This may be because vega may not have been used much prior to the 
crisis when lending was booming anyway, and banks relied more on vega after the crisis to 
encourage employees to reignite lending which slowed down during the crisis. In contrast, 
capital ratios always have a significant negative correlation with real estate loans at the 1% level. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the association between bank risk taking and bank incentives from (1) CEO 
compensation vega and (2) capital structure. I use real estate lending to measure bank risk-
taking. There is a significant positive relation between vega and the amount of real estate 
lending. There is also a significant negative relation between bank capital and real estate lending. 
15 
In other words, banks which offer high CEO vega and have lower capital ratios tend to allocate a 
larger portion of their loan portfolio to real estate lending. 
Subsample tests show that the positive relation between vega and real estate lending is 
statistically significant among small and well-capitalized banks, banks with low market-to-book 
ratios, and high stock volatility. These banks have high exposure to real estate lending and rapid 
loan portfolios growth. The positive association between vega and real estate lending is only 
significant after the financial crisis. These findings suggest that smaller growth focused banks 
use vega to motivate executives during recessions. If banks only use vega to motivate executives 
during a recession, then regulators cannot use vega to limit bank risk during a boom. 
In contrast, the negative relation between a bank’s capital ratio and real estate lending is 
significant for all subsamples of banks and all time periods considered. Banks with more capital 
conduct less real estate lending. Bank capital creates a strong incentive to manage risks (Mehran 
and Thakor (2011)). 
Coles et al. (2006) find that higher managerial compensation vega prompts executives to 
both invest in riskier assets and implement more aggressive debt policy. The marginal 
contribution of this paper is that CEO compensation vega is associated with a specific type of 
risky investment, real estate lending, which has attracted more attention from bank regulators 
since the Great Recession. Furthermore, this paper verifies that a higher capital ratio is associated 
with lower real estate lending and risk taking. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Appendix A lists all the variables examined in the empirical analyses presented in this paper, 
their descriptions, and data sources. 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
CEO Compensation Characteristics 
Vega Sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
stock return volatility, measured in 
thousands of U.S. dollars 
ExecuComp, calculated by 
the method described in 
Core and Guay (2002) 
Delta Sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
share price, measured in thousands of 
U.S. dollars 
ExecuComp, calculated by 
the method described in 
Core and Guay (2002) 
Cash compensation CEO cash compensation including 
salary and bonus, measured in 
thousands of U.S. dollars 
ExecuComp 
Total compensation CEO total compensation including 
salary, bonus, equity, and value of 
options grants, measured in thousands 
of U.S. dollars 
ExecuComp 
Tenure (years) Number of years that the CEO has been 
with the bank 
ExecuComp 
CRO present A dummy variable indicating the 
presence of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
or positions with risk management 
responsibilities (such as Chief Credit 
Officer, Chief Lending Officer, or Chief 
Compliance Officer) in ExecuComp 
ExecuComp, positions 
similar to CRO defined 
by Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) 
Bank Asset and Financial Characteristics 
Total assets  Book value of total assets, measured in 
millions of U.S. dollars 
Call Report 
Risk-weighted assets Risk-weighted assets / Total assets Call Report 
Total loans Total loans / Total assets Call Report 
Real estate loans Real estate loans / Total assets Call Report 
Non-real estate loans Non-real estate loans / Total assets Call Report 
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Variable Description Source 
Bank Asset and Financial Characteristics (Continued) 
Real loan growth  Growth rate in bank lending Call Report 
Market-to-book ratio Market value to book value of equity Call Report, Compustat, 
CRSP 
Book leverage Book value of total liabilities / Book 
value of total assets 
Call report 
Market leverage Book value of total liabilities / Market 
value of total assets (= Book value of 
total liabilities + Market value of equity) 
Call Report, Compustat, 
CRSP 
Tier 1 capital ratio Tier 1 capital / Risk-weighted assets Call Report 
Risk-based capital ratio  Risk-based capital / Risk-weighted 
assets 
Call Report 
Institutional ownership  Total 13-F institutional ownership / 
Number of shares outstanding. 
Thomson’s Reuters 
Loan loss provisions  Loan loss provisioning / Total loans Call Report 
Net loan charge-offs Loan charge-offs minus recoveries / 
Total loan 
Call Report 
Stock return The annualized stock return of the bank CRSP 
Stock volatility  The annualized volatility of daily stock 
returns of the bank 
CRSP 
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Appendix B: Bank Holding Companies Included in the Empirical Analysis 
 
Appendix B lists all the bank holding companies (BHCs) that are included in the empirical 
analysis presented in this paper. BHCs are ranked by their most recently reported asset size. The 
most recent report year is the last year a BHC appears in the dataset that combines Call Report, 
ExecuComp, Compustat, and CRSP. 
 
 
Rank by  
Asset Size 
 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) 
Report  
Year 
Asset Size  
($millions) 
1 Wells Fargo & Company 2014        1,488,055  
2 Citigroup Inc. 2011        1,396,568  
3 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 2014           911,330  
4 Morgan Stanley 2014           841,372  
5 JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014           817,763  
6 Wachovia Corporation 2007           760,558  
7 Bank Of America Corporation 2014           660,499  
8 American International Group 2014           547,111  
9 PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 2014           362,137  
10 Bank Of New York Mellon Corporation 2013           355,984  
11 Capital One Financial Corporation 2014           348,549  
12 U.S. Bancorp 2014           282,428  
13 Metlife, Inc. 2014           267,934  
14 BankNorth Group, Inc. 2006           253,196  
15 FleetBoston Financial Corporation 2003           199,426  
16 Countrywide Financial Corporation 2007           193,195  
17 BB&T Corporation 2014           183,010  
18 SunTrust Banks, Inc. 2014           179,713  
19 Charles Schwab Corporation 2014           163,627  
20 Principal Financial Group, Inc. 2014           159,193  
21 American Express Company 2014           159,103  
22 National City Corporation 2007           153,679  
23 Ameriprise Financial, Inc. 2014           136,758  
24 Regions Financial Corporation 2014           121,967  
25 Northern Trust Corporation 2014             94,456  
26 Bank Of New York Company, Inc. 2014             89,537  
27 Fifth Third Bancorp 2014             89,422  
28 Compass Bankcshares, Inc. 2006             89,357  
29 Keycorp 2014             83,454  
30 State Street Corporation 2014             79,342  
31 Discover Financial Services 2014             60,722  
32 North Fork Bancorporation, Inc. 2005             60,386  
33 Comerica Incorporated 2014             55,903  
34 Marshall & Ilsley Corporation 2010             52,003  
35 Southtrust Corporation 2003             51,718  
36 Zions Bancorporation 2014             51,036  
37 UnionBanCal Corporation 2007             49,433  
38 New York Community Bancorp, Inc. 2014             48,516  
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Rank by  
Asset Size 
 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) 
Report  
Year 
Asset Size  
($millions) 
39 Cit Group Inc. 2014             48,178  
40 Mellon Financial Corporation 2006             47,744  
41 Regions Financial Corporation 2011             46,597  
42 E*Trade Financial Corporation 2014             46,280  
43 Popular, Inc. 2014             45,168  
44 Charter One Financial, Inc. 2003             37,818  
45 People's United Financial, Inc. 2014             37,155  
46 MBNA Corporation 2004             36,354  
47 East West Bancorp, Inc. 2014             35,927  
48 Union Planters Corporation 2003             34,263  
49 M&T Bank Corporation 2014             34,148  
50 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 2014             28,197  
51 Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 2014             27,915  
52 Hancock Holding Company 2013             26,642  
53 Synovus Financial Corp. 2014             26,519  
54 Raymond James Financial, Inc. 2014             26,474  
55 Colonial Bancgroup, Inc. 2008             26,263  
56 Associated Banc-Corp 2014             24,227  
57 First Horizon National Corporation 2014             24,224  
58 Commerce Bancorp, LLC 2007             21,391  
59 National Commerce Financial Corp. 2002             20,140  
60 Greenpoint Financial Corp. 2003             20,103  
61 Tcf Financial Corporation 2014             18,816  
62 Webster Financial Corporation 2014             18,719  
63 Hibernia Corporation 2004             18,560  
64 Wintrust Financial Corporation 2014             18,098  
65 Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 2014             17,733  
66 Mercantile Bankshares Corporation 2006             17,575  
67 Provident Bancorp, Inc. 2003             16,542  
68 Astoria Financial Corporation 2014             16,497  
69 Privatebancorp, Inc. 2014             14,602  
70 Washington Federal, Inc. 2014             14,370  
71 Flagstar Bancorp, Inc. 2014             14,368  
72 City National Corporation 2014             13,925  
73 Carolina First Corporation 2009             13,650  
74 First Bancorp 2014             12,714  
75 Whitney Holding Corporation 2010             12,385  
76 Valley National Bancorp 2014             12,267  
77 Bank Of Hawaii Corporation 2014             12,195  
78 International Bancshares Corporation 2014             12,128  
79 Ucbh Holdings, Inc. 2008             11,804  
80 Cathay General Bancorp 2014             11,517  
81 Bancorpsouth, Inc. 2014             10,834  
82 People's Mutual Holdings 2013             10,696  
83 Firstmerit Corporation 2014             10,560  
84 Banner Corporation 2014               9,916  
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Rank by  
Asset Size 
 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) 
Report  
Year 
Asset Size  
($millions) 
85 Corus Bankshares, Inc. 2008               9,572  
86 Fulton Financial Corporation 2014               9,280  
87 Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc. 2014               9,262  
88 Sterling Financial Corporation 2013               9,203  
89 Franklin Resources, Inc. 2014               9,185  
90 UMB Financial Corporation 2014               8,916  
91 Wilmington Trust Corporation 2010               8,874  
92 First American Financial Corporation 2014               8,837  
93 MB Financial, Inc. 2014               8,820  
94 Old National Bancorp 2014               8,795  
95 Hudson City Bancorp, Inc. 2014               8,778  
96 National Penn Bancshares, Inc. 2014               8,557  
97 Viewpoint Financial Group, Inc. 2014               8,440  
98 Trustmark Corporation 2014               8,329  
99 United Bankshares, Inc. 2014               8,314  
100 Newalliance Bancshares, Inc. 2010               8,300  
101 Bofi Holding, Inc. 2014               8,168  
102 Umpqua Holdings Corporation 2014               8,151  
103 Northwest Bancshares Inc. 2014               7,937  
104 Provident New York Bancorp, Inc. 2014               7,734  
105 Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc. 2014               7,706  
106 Greater Bay Bancorp 2006               7,657  
107 United Community Banks, Inc. 2014               7,652  
108 Simmons First National Corporation 2014               7,554  
109 Community Bank System, Inc. 2014               7,503  
110 Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. 2014               7,466  
111 Hudson United Bancorp 2004               6,738  
112 Amegy Bancorporation, Inc. 2004               6,633  
113 Brookline Bancorp, Inc. 2014               6,512  
114 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 2014               6,359  
115 First Commonwealth Financial Corporation 2014               6,198  
116 F.N.B. Corporation 2014               6,016  
117 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc. 2014               5,965  
118 Independent Bank Corp. 2014               5,895  
119 SVB Financial Group 2014               5,684  
120 Community First Bankshares, Inc. 2003               5,483  
121 Riggs National Corporation 2004               5,473  
122 NBT Bancorp Inc. 2014               5,336  
123 Provident Bankshares Corporation 2008               5,145  
124 T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. 2014               5,127  
125 Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 2014               5,115  
126 Westamerica Bancorporation 2014               5,053  
127 Republic Bancorp Inc. 2005               5,031  
128 Irwin Financial Corporation 2008               4,964  
129 Dime Community Bancshares 2014               4,832  
130 Stifel Financial Corp. 2014               4,514  
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Rank by  
Asset Size 
 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) 
Report  
Year 
Asset Size  
($millions) 
131 Seacoast Financial Services Corporation 2003               4,477  
132 Sterling Bancshares, Inc. 2010               4,443  
133 Taylor Capital Group, Inc. 2013               4,404  
134 Chittenden Corporation 2006               4,366  
135 Texas Regional Bancshares, Inc. 2005               4,186  
136 Oritani Financial Corp 2014               4,127  
137 SWS Group, Inc. 2014               3,996  
138 Bank Of The Ozarks Inc. 2014               3,765  
139 Glacier Bancorp, Inc. 2014               3,707  
140 PacWest Bancorp 2014               3,677  
141 Frontier Financial Corporation 2008               3,579  
142 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc. 2014               3,506  
143 Wilshire Bancorp, Inc. 2014               3,437  
144 Hanmi Financial Corporation 2014               3,414  
145 First Financial Bancorp 2014               3,323  
146 Oriental Financial Group Inc. 2014               3,039  
147 Tompkins Financial Corporation 2014               2,968  
148 City Holding Company 2014               2,848  
149 S & T Bancorp, Inc. 2014               2,840  
150 Bank Mutual Corp New 2014               2,694  
151 TrustCo Bank Corp NY 2014               2,584  
152 Concord EFS, Inc. 2002               2,559  
153 First Financial Bankshares, Inc. 2014               2,478  
154 First NBC Bank Holding Co 2014               2,430  
155 Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc. 2010               2,344  
156 Columbia Banking System, Inc. 2014               2,245  
157 First Indiana Corporation 2006               2,131  
158 CVB Financial Corp. 2014               2,016  
159 Home Bancshares, Inc. 2014               1,911  
160 Central Pacific Financial Corp. 2014               1,863  
161 First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. 2014               1,801  
162 Independent Bank Corporation 2014               1,744  
163 SEI Investments Company 2014               1,332  
164 Cascade Bancorp 2014               1,297  
165 Nara Bancorp, Inc. 2014               1,278  
166 Sterling Bancorp 2012               1,277  
167 Southside Bancshares, Inc. 2014               1,063  
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Figure 1: Time Series of Bank CEO Compensation Vega 
 
Figure 1 shows the time series of average bank CEO vega from 2000 to 2014 based on annual 
data from ExecuComp, Compustat, and CRSP. Vega is measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. 
 
 
 
 
  
0
50
100
150
200
250
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
V
eg
a 
($
0
0
0
s)
  
27 
Figure 2: Time Series of Real Estate Loans 
 
Figure 2 shows the time series of banks’ average direct exposure to real estate loans from the 
first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2014 based on quarterly data from FRY-9 reports 
(Call Reports). Real estate loans are measured as the ratio to total assets of the bank. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of CEO compensation, assets and financial characteristics for a 
sample of U.S. bank holding companies that are stock-listed during fiscal years 2000-2014. CEO 
compensation data is reported annually, whereas bank assets and financial data are reported quarterly. 
Vega, delta, cash and total compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in 
millions of U.S. dollars. Risk-weighted assets, total loans, real estate loans, non-real estate loans are all 
ratios to total assets. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its 
total risk-weighted assets. Loan loss provisions and net loan charge-offs are reported as ratios to the total 
amount of loans made previously and measured in percentage points. Variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean STD Min. 25th Median 75th Max. 
         
Bank CEO Compensation Characteristics 
Vega 1611 123 164 0.000 8 39 180 501 
Delta 1567 493 626 1.000 59 196 657 1953 
Cash compensation 1659 1489 1882 256 647 900 1377 12151 
Total compensation 1659 4284 4193 365 1192 2415 5944 13524 
Tenure (years) 1658 4.375 3.210 2 4 6 1 20 
CRO present 1659 0.656 0.475 0 0 1 1 1 
 
        
Bank Asset and Financial Characteristics 
Total assets  1132 121031 314664 1332 6309 14480 59490 1954877 
Risk-weighted assets 1214 0.732 0.141 0.363 0.649 0.742 0.826 1.077 
Total loans 1653 0.584 0.220 0.000 0.524 0.657 0.730 0.881 
Real estate loans 1653 0.378 0.208 0.000 0.247 0.406 0.528 0.858 
Non-real estate loans 1653 0.206 0.139 0.000 0.105 0.198 0.277 0.730 
Real loan growth  1580 0.265 1.195 -0.857 -0.187 0.000 0.255 8.635 
Market-to-book ratio 1646 2.099 1.881 -1.617 0.937 1.617 2.671 11.431 
Book leverage 1647 0.867 0.144 0.114 0.876 0.898 0.915 1.011 
Market leverage 1652 0.463 0.051 0.149 0.467 0.473 0.478 0.488 
Tier 1 capital ratio 1196 0.091 0.057 0.003 0.070 0.082 0.095 0.642 
Risk-based capital ratio  1112 0.153 0.106 0.009 0.118 0.136 0.156 1.447 
Institutional ownership  1528 0.071 0.132 0.000 0.011 0.040 0.083 3.371 
Stock return 1659 0.027 0.080 -0.028 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.730 
Stock volatility  1656 0.180 0.565 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.074 5.637 
Loan loss provisions  1623 0.420 0.767 -0.991 0.055 0.174 0.395 8.768 
Net loan charge-offs 1622 0.397 0.711 -0.140 0.039 0.159 0.406 7.053 
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Table 2: Correlations between Real Estate Loans and Loan Loss Measures 
 
Table 2 reports Pearson’s pairwise correlation between banks’ lending exposures (real estate and 
non-real estate loans) and loans loss measures. Real estate and non-real estate loans are measures 
as ratios to total assets. Loan loss measures are loan loss provisions and net loan charge-offs as 
percentages of total loans. * indicates that Pearson's correlation coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) 
Variable Real estate loans Non-real estate loans 
 
  
Loan loss provisions 0.081** -0.023 
Net loan charge-offs 0.091*** -0.044 
 
  
N 1653 1653 
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Table 3: Real Estate Loans Related to Vega and Capital Ratios  
 
Table 3 reports results from regressions relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and 
capital ratio. Real estate loans are measured as a ratio to total assets. Vega, delta, and cash 
compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. 
dollars. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its total 
risk-weighted assets. The capital ratio used in columns (1) and (3) is Tier 1 capital ratio, and that 
in columns (2) and (4) is the risk-based capital ratio. Year fixed effects are not included in 
columns (1) and (2) but included in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
Variable 
Real Estate Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vega 0.0000492* 0.0000497* 0.0000516* 0.0000526* 
 
(1.99) (2.00) (2.06) (2.09) 
Delta -0.00000225 -0.00000254 -0.00000240 -0.00000270 
 
(-1.55) (-1.77) (-1.64) (-1.87) 
Cash compensation -0.00000110 -0.00000115 -0.00000134 -0.00000133 
 
(-0.84) (-0.88) (-1.01) (-1.00) 
Tenure (years) 0.0193 0.0240 0.0202 0.0242 
 
(1.48) (1.70) (1.51) (1.66) 
CRO present -0.00705 -0.00856 0.0145 0.00928 
 
(-0.69) (-0.82) (0.68) (0.43) 
Log (total assets) -0.0460*** -0.0451*** -0.0460*** -0.0451*** 
 
(-14.86) (-14.45) (-14.72) (-14.35) 
Total loans 0.0228 0.0136 0.0200 0.0118 
 
(0.90) (0.53) (0.78) (0.45) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.000973 0.00127 0.00129 0.00155 
 
(0.39) (0.51) (0.51) (0.61) 
Stock volatility -0.00000237* -0.00000223* -0.00000236* -0.00000224* 
 
(-2.53) (-2.40) (-2.50) (-2.39) 
Institutional ownership  -0.0000688 -0.000317 0.0000177 -0.000222 
 
(-0.13) (-0.59) (0.03) (-0.41) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.886*** 
 
-0.885*** 
 
 
(-9.52) 
 
(-9.47) 
 
Risk-based capital ratio  
 
-0.658*** 
 
-0.660*** 
  
(-12.32) 
 
(-12.31) 
Year fixed-effects  No No Yes Yes 
N 1023 955 1023 955 
Adj. R2 0.256 0.305 0.252 0.302 
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Table 4: Non-Real Estate Loans Related to Vega and Capital Ratios 
 
Table 4 reports results from regressions relating a bank’s non-real estate loans to its CEO vega 
and capital ratio. Non-real estate loans are measured as a ratio to total assets. Vega, delta, and 
cash compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of 
U.S. dollars. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its 
total risk-weighted assets. The capital ratio used in columns (1) and (3) is Tier 1 capital ratio, and 
that in columns (2) and (4) is the risk-based capital ratio. Year fixed effects are not included in 
columns (1) and (2) but included in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
Variable 
Non-Real Estate Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vega 0.0000521 0.0000485 0.0000508 0.0000438 
 
(1.84) (1.76) (1.76) (1.55) 
Delta 0.00000206 0.00000216 0.00000190 0.00000206 
 
(1.19) (1.29) (1.09) (1.22) 
Cash compensation 0.00000303 0.00000323* 0.00000336* 0.00000363* 
 
(1.85) (2.02) (2.02) (2.25) 
Tenure (years) -0.0171 -0.0369 -0.0196 -0.0367 
 
(-1.04) (-1.92) (-1.17) (-1.88) 
CRO present 0.00448 0.00612 0.0183 0.0211 
 
(0.41) (0.56) (0.75) (0.88) 
Log (total assets) 0.00122 -0.00162 0.000966 -0.00204 
 
(0.38) (-0.50) (0.30) (-0.63) 
Total loans -0.0168 -0.0161 -0.0131 -0.0106 
 
(-0.68) (-0.65) (-0.53) (-0.43) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.00471* -0.00449 -0.00516* -0.00508* 
 
(-1.98) (-1.91) (-2.14) (-2.13) 
Stock volatility -0.00000190* -0.00000176 -0.00000195* -0.00000173 
 
(-1.97) (-1.88) (-1.99) (-1.81) 
Institutional ownership  0.00144* 0.00165** 0.00149** 0.00167** 
 
(2.56) (2.99) (2.61) (3.00) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.157 
 
-0.167 
 
 
(-1.75) 
 
(-1.84) 
 
Risk-based capital ratio  
 
-0.287*** 
 
-0.290*** 
  
(-5.85) 
 
(-5.89) 
Year fixed-effects  No No Yes Yes 
N 635 605 635 605 
Adj. R2 0.042 0.093 0.040 0.094 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics by Subsample 
 
Table 5 reports the summary statistics by subsample. The subsamples include (1) banks with low and high Tier 1 capital ratios, (2) 
banks with low and high risk-based capital ratio, (3) small and large banks, (4) banks with low and high market-to-book ratios, and (5) 
banks with low and high stock volatility. Low and high Tier 1 (risk-based) capital ratios are defined as below and above the median 
Tier 1 (risk-based) capital ratio, respectively. Small banks and large banks are defined as banks with total assets below and above the 
median total assets, respectively. Low and high market-to-book ratios are defined as below and above the median market-to-book 
ratio, respectively. Low and high stock volatility are defined as below and above the median stock volatility, respectively. Summary 
statistics on the same variables as in Table 1 are reported in this table. Data about CEO compensation are reported annually, whereas 
bank assets and financial data are reported quarterly. Vega, delta, cash and total compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. 
dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars. Risk-weighted assets, total loans, real estate loans, non-real estate loans are all 
ratios to total assets. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its total risk-weighted assets. 
Loan loss provisions and net loan charge-offs are reported as ratios to the total amount of loans made previously and measured in 
percentage points. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions and data 
sources. 
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Variable 
Tier 1  
Capital Ratio 
Risk-based  
Capital ratio 
 
Asset Size 
Market-to 
-book Ratio 
Stock  
Volatility 
Low High Low High Small Large Low High Low High 
           
Bank CEO Compensation Characteristics 
Vega 160 101 118 126 42 190 111 136 66 180 
Delta 555 453 411 536 289 691 432 554 283 696 
Cash compensation 1867 1282 1422 1528 820 2089 1520 1463 956 2023 
Total compensation 5082 3818 3937 4470 1908 6592 4110 4461 2437 6135 
Tenure (years) 4.272 4.409 4.271 4.444 4.593 4.605 4.459 4.281 4.195 4.556 
CRO present 0.644 0.665 0.648 0.661 0.705 0.718 0.652 0.659 0.653 0.660 
 
          
Bank Asset and Financial Characteristics 
Total assets  256426 78076 94662 130200 7423 233044 138481 90042 19951 213578 
Risk-weighted assets 0.700 0.763 0.774 0.696 0.722 0.724 0.725 0.737 0.723 0.741 
Total loans 0.571 0.592 0.655 0.547 0.607 0.535 0.598 0.570 0.638 0.530 
Real estate loans 0.359 0.388 0.428 0.352 0.451 0.304 0.403 0.352 0.455 0.301 
Non-real estate loans 0.212 0.202 0.228 0.194 0.156 0.230 0.194 0.217 0.183 0.229 
Real loan growth  0.083 0.373 0.154 0.319 0.466 0.478 0.496 0.016 0.258 0.273 
Market-to-book ratio 2.128 2.078 2.166 2.069 2.064 2.175 2.051 2.153 2.080 2.126 
Book leverage 0.872 0.864 0.871 0.865 0.870 0.856 0.853 0.881 0.878 0.855 
Market leverage 0.462 0.464 0.465 0.462 0.464 0.464 0.465 0.462 0.462 0.465 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.069 0.112 0.075 0.104 0.106 0.086 0.090 0.091 0.087 0.094 
Risk-based capital ratio  0.128 0.177 0.118 0.188 0.170 0.146 0.148 0.158 0.145 0.161 
Institutional ownership  0.073 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.060 0.076 0.073 0.068 0.063 0.078 
Stock return 0.047 0.016 0.029 0.027 0.002 0.052 0.027 0.028 0.004 0.050 
Stock volatility  0.284 0.120 0.194 0.175 0.019 0.352 0.176 0.184 0.006 0.354 
Loan loss provisions  0.396 0.436 0.429 0.418 0.431 0.527 0.399 0.443 0.362 0.478 
Net loan charge-offs 0.347 0.427 0.356 0.422 0.398 0.527 0.384 0.412 0.332 0.463 
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Table 6: Low vs. High Capital Ratios 
 
Table 6 reports results from subsample regressions relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and capital ratio. The two 
subsamples in this table are banks with low capital ratios and banks with high capital ratios. Low and high capital ratios are defined as 
below and above the median capital ratio, respectively. Panel A defines the two subsamples based on Tier 1 capital ratio, and Panel B 
defines them based on the risk-based capital ratio. Real estate loans are measured as a ratio to total assets. Vega, delta, and cash 
compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars. Tier 1 and risk-based capital 
ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its total risk-weighted assets. In both panels, columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report 
results for banks with low capital ratios, and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report for banks with high capital ratio. The capital ratio 
used in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) is Tier 1 capital ratio, and that in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) is the risk-based capital ratio. Year 
fixed effects are not included in columns (1)-(4) but included in columns (5)-(8). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% 
level. 
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A. Low vs. High Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
 
Real Estate Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Vega 0.0000572 0.000232** 0.0000327 0.000146* 0.0000529 0.000245** 0.0000371 0.000150 
 
(1.46) (2.94) (0.82) (2.01) (1.32) (2.93) (0.91) (1.94) 
Delta 0.000000351 -0.0000103* 0.00000110 -0.00000556 0.000000605 -0.0000104* 0.00000140 -0.00000506 
 
(0.20) (-2.46) (0.63) (-1.44) (0.33) (-2.40) (0.78) (-1.27) 
Cash compensation 0.00000219 -0.00000978* 0.000000197 -0.00000779* 0.00000203 -0.0000100* 0.000000101 -0.00000810* 
 
(1.16) (-2.38) (0.11) (-2.07) (1.04) (-2.35) (0.05) (-2.07) 
Tenure (years) 0.0557 0.0388 0.125* 0.0417* 0.0709 0.0411 0.125* 0.0493* 
 
(1.37) (1.78) (2.10) (1.97) (1.59) (1.76) (2.02) (2.19) 
CRO present 0.0285 -0.0273 0.0229 -0.0313 0.108* -0.0293 0.0580 -0.0573 
 
(1.49) (-1.35) (1.16) (-1.67) (2.17) (-0.71) (1.12) (-1.44) 
Log (total assets) -0.0310*** -0.0314*** -0.0265*** -0.0277*** -0.0295*** -0.0311** -0.0256*** -0.0258** 
 
(-4.42) (-3.54) (-3.64) (-3.38) (-4.08) (-3.30) (-3.41) (-2.99) 
Total loans 0.0607 -0.00614 0.0595 0.00310 0.0619 -0.00725 0.0711 0.00954 
 
(1.36) (-0.14) (1.31) (0.07) (1.35) (-0.16) (1.51) (0.22) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0147* 0.000434 -0.0149* 0.00305 -0.0133* 0.000428 -0.0139* 0.00296 
 
(-2.31) (0.06) (-2.39) (0.49) (-2.02) (0.06) (-2.15) (0.47) 
Stock volatility -0.00000254 0.00000471 -0.00000186 0.00000354 -0.00000231 0.00000475 -0.00000179 0.00000346 
 
(-1.83) (1.84) (-1.37) (1.52) (-1.62) (1.81) (-1.27) (1.45) 
Institutional ownership  -0.000196 0.000211 0.0000404 0.0000537 -0.000317 0.000437 0.00000720 0.000499 
 
(-0.21) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) (-0.34) (0.36) (0.01) (0.45) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.00547*** -0.00399 
  
-0.00559*** -0.00473 
  
 
(-4.14) (-1.10) 
  
(-4.14) (-1.27) 
  
Risk-based capital ratio  
  
-2.633*** -0.702*** 
  
-2.577*** -0.721*** 
   
(-7.37) (-8.47) 
  
(-6.98) (-8.50) 
Year fixed-effects  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 346 351 312 342 346 351 312 342 
Adj. R2 0.166 0.092 0.272 0.158 0.078 0.258 0.239 0.247 
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B. Low vs. High Risk-based Capital Ratio 
 
 
Real Estate Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Vega 0.0000391 0.000132* 0.0000342 0.000114 0.0000429 0.000133* 0.0000392 0.000121 
 
(0.98) (2.19) (0.84) (1.77) (1.04) (2.13) (0.93) (1.80) 
Delta 0.000000432 -0.00000432 0.000000937 -0.00000355 0.000000151 -0.00000446 0.000000779 -0.00000329 
 
(0.21) (-1.74) (0.45) (-1.43) (0.07) (-1.77) (0.36) (-1.30) 
Cash compensation -0.00000110 -0.000000660 -0.00000205 -0.00000209 -0.00000145 -0.000000675 -0.00000234 -0.00000179 
 
(-0.58) (-0.23) (-1.07) (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.23) (-1.19) (-0.61) 
Tenure (years) 0.0560 0.0446* 0.0599 0.0532* 0.0618 0.0374 0.0626 0.0513 
 
(1.58) (1.98) (1.66) (2.07) (1.56) (1.58) (1.56) (1.87) 
CRO present 0.00683 -0.0100 -0.00169 -0.0283 -0.00359 0.0561 0.000951 0.0141 
 
(0.39) (-0.50) (-0.10) (-1.34) (-0.08) (1.36) (0.02) (0.31) 
Log (total assets) -0.0142* -0.0450*** -0.0153* -0.0505*** -0.0114 -0.0448*** -0.0132 -0.0518*** 
 
(-2.18) (-5.48) (-2.33) (-5.75) (-1.66) (-5.32) (-1.90) (-5.71) 
Total loans -0.00232 0.0800 0.00760 0.0565 -0.00625 0.0788 0.00750 0.0656 
 
(-0.06) (1.65) (0.20) (1.10) (-0.16) (1.60) (0.19) (1.26) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0125* -0.000766 -0.0143** 0.000306 -0.0112 0.000659 -0.0129* 0.00104 
 
(-2.29) (-0.10) (-2.63) (0.04) (-1.96) (0.09) (-2.26) (0.14) 
Stock volatility -0.00000373* 0.00000212 -0.00000352* 0.00000215 -0.00000410* 0.00000227 -0.00000386* 0.00000226 
 
(-2.39) (1.19) (-2.22) (1.22) (-2.52) (1.26) (-2.33) (1.25) 
Institutional ownership  -0.00101 -0.000507 -0.000933 0.000218 -0.00111 -0.000562 -0.00111 0.000325 
 
(-1.17) (-0.45) (-1.07) (0.20) (-1.23) (-0.49) (-1.22) (0.28) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.00769** -0.00359* 
  
-0.00770** -0.00321* 
  
 
(-3.00) (-2.38) 
  
(-2.90) (-2.07) 
  
Risk-based capital ratio  
  
0.995 -0.607*** 
  
0.950 -0.607*** 
   
(1.68) (-6.53) 
  
(1.51) (-6.33) 
Year fixed-effects  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 322 371 323 327 322 371 323 327 
Adj. R2 0.130 0.159 0.116 0.258 0.109 0.150 0.093 0.244 
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Table7: Small vs. Large Banks 
 
Table 7 reports results from subsample regressions relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and capital ratio. The two 
subsamples in this table are small banks and large banks defined as banks with total assets below and above the median total assets, 
respectively. Real estate loans are measured as a ratio to total assets. Vega, delta, and cash compensation are measured in thousands of 
U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based 
capital to its total risk-weighted assets. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report results for small banks, and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
report for large banks. The capital ratio used in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) is Tier 1 capital ratio, and that in columns (3), (4), (7), 
and (8) is the risk-based capital ratio. Year fixed effects are not included in columns (1)-(4) but included in columns (5)-(8). Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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 Real Estate Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Vega 0.000318 0.000112 0.000330* 0.0000855 0.000398* 0.000110 0.000384* 0.0000884 
 
(1.85) (1.72) (2.00) (1.39) (2.18) (1.64) (2.18) (1.40) 
Delta 0.00000260 -2.88e-08 -0.00000135 -0.00000100 0.00000250 0.000000164 -0.000000904 -0.000000691 
 
(0.36) (-0.01) (-0.21) (-0.42) (0.33) (0.06) (-0.13) (-0.28) 
Cash compensation 0.00000416 -0.00000547 0.00000166 -0.00000463 0.00000103 -0.00000474 -0.000000337 -0.00000401 
 
(0.49) (-1.47) (0.21) (-1.32) (0.11) (-1.23) (-0.04) (-1.10) 
Tenure (years) 0.0255 0.103 0.0255 0.0998 0.0330 0.0912 0.0346 0.0918 
 
(1.14) (1.64) (1.17) (1.68) (1.32) (1.30) (1.43) (1.38) 
CRO present 0.0181 -0.0175 0.0214 -0.00631 -0.0138 0.0892 -0.00248 0.0566 
 
(0.73) (-0.58) (0.89) (-0.22) (-0.30) (1.09) (-0.06) (0.73) 
Log (total assets) -0.00950 -0.0267* -0.00866 -0.0279* -0.0109 -0.0254* -0.00889 -0.0263* 
 
(-0.83) (-2.27) (-0.78) (-2.54) (-0.89) (-2.13) (-0.75) (-2.35) 
Total loans 0.0113 0.0879 -0.00551 0.0696 -0.00172 0.0956 -0.0122 0.0816 
 
(0.19) (1.44) (-0.10) (1.21) (-0.03) (1.54) (-0.20) (1.39) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.00996 0.000988 0.00855 0.00255 0.00894 0.000893 0.00809 0.00314 
 
(1.39) (0.10) (1.23) (0.26) (1.20) (0.08) (1.13) (0.31) 
Stock volatility -0.0000227 0.000000267 -0.0000201 0.000000777 -0.0000204 -0.000000131 -0.0000181 0.000000436 
 
(-1.44) (0.12) (-1.32) (0.36) (-1.20) (-0.06) (-1.11) (0.20) 
Institutional ownership  -0.000422 0.000430 -0.0000985 0.000481 -0.000291 0.000302 -0.0000572 0.000279 
 
(-0.36) (0.26) (-0.09) (0.31) (-0.23) (0.17) (-0.05) (0.17) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -1.120*** -0.752 
  
-1.104*** -0.846* 
  
 
(-6.13) (-1.82) 
  
(-5.81) (-2.00) 
  
Risk-based capital ratio  
  
-0.779*** -1.795*** 
  
-0.785*** -1.757*** 
   
(-7.32) (-5.30) 
  
(-7.09) (-5.06) 
Year fixed-effects  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 218 205 218 205 218 205 218 205 
Adj. R2 0.191 0.074 0.241 0.178 0.169 0.088 0.225 0.184 
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Table 8: Low vs. High Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 8 reports results from subsample regressions relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and capital ratio. The two 
subsamples in this table are banks with low market-to-book ratios and banks with high market-to-book ratios. Low and high market-
to-book ratios are defined as below and above the median market-to-book ratio, respectively. Real estate loans are measured as a ratio 
to total assets. Vega, delta, and cash compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. 
dollars. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its total risk-weighted assets. Columns (1), (3), 
(5), and (7) report results for banks with low market-to-book ratio, and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report for banks with high 
market-to-book ratio. The capital ratio used in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) is Tier 1 capital ratio, and that in columns (3), (4), (7), and 
(8) is the risk-based capital ratio. Year fixed effects are not included in columns (1)-(4) but included in columns (5)-(8). Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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 Real Estate Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Vega 0.000181* 0.0000306 0.000167* 0.0000278 0.000220** 0.0000355 0.000203** 0.0000316 
 
(2.37) (0.80) (2.34) (0.69) (2.80) (0.91) (2.74) (0.77) 
Delta 0.00000125 -0.00000262 0.00000247 -0.00000253 0.00000153 -0.00000272 0.00000267 -0.00000219 
 
(0.50) (-1.19) (1.06) (-1.13) (0.60) (-1.20) (1.13) (-0.95) 
Cash compensation -0.00000651 0.000000442 -0.00000703* 0.000000322 -0.00000758* 0.000000498 -0.00000802* 0.000000674 
 
(-1.74) (0.26) (-2.01) (0.18) (-2.00) (0.28) (-2.26) (0.36) 
Tenure (years) 0.0489 0.0433 0.0541* 0.0758* 0.0569* 0.0482 0.0614* 0.0815* 
 
(1.80) (1.76) (2.13) (2.29) (1.98) (1.82) (2.28) (2.36) 
CRO present -0.0232 0.0124 -0.0190 0.00872 -0.0445 0.0325 -0.0327 0.0242 
 
(-1.03) (0.74) (-0.89) (0.48) (-0.72) (0.96) (-0.57) (0.64) 
Log (total assets) -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.0374*** -0.0315*** -0.0365*** -0.0337*** -0.0398*** -0.0313*** 
 
(-3.62) (-5.32) (-4.24) (-4.53) (-3.74) (-5.11) (-4.36) (-4.37) 
Total loans 0.0230 0.0960* -0.00493 0.101* 0.0184 0.0978* -0.00589 0.115* 
 
(0.46) (2.39) (-0.11) (2.35) (0.37) (2.36) (-0.13) (2.59) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.00614 -0.00881 -0.00878 -0.00921 -0.00961 -0.00797 -0.0115 -0.00836 
 
(-0.74) (-1.68) (-1.13) (-1.71) (-1.14) (-1.48) (-1.45) (-1.50) 
Stock volatility 0.000000653 -0.00000116 0.00000146 -0.00000111 0.00000118 -0.00000119 0.00000196 -0.00000117 
 
(0.28) (-0.84) (0.68) (-0.78) (0.50) (-0.85) (0.89) (-0.81) 
Institutional ownership  -0.000417 -0.0000762 -0.000235 -0.0000697 0.0000729 0.0000926 0.000257 0.000249 
 
(-0.30) (-0.09) (-0.18) (-0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.19) (0.28) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.901** -0.867*** 
  
-0.925** -0.873*** 
  
 
(-2.98) (-6.35) 
  
(-2.95) (-6.23) 
  
Risk-based capital ratio  
  
-1.575*** -0.587*** 
  
-1.568*** -0.598*** 
   
(-7.15) (-7.20) 
  
(-6.96) (-7.14) 
Year fixed-effects  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 307 396 303 353 307 396 303 353 
Adj. R2 0.094 0.225 0.208 0.259 0.102 0.210 0.214 0.250 
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Table 9: Low vs. High Stock Volatility 
 
Table 9 reports results from subsample regressions relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and capital ratio. The two 
subsamples in this table are banks with low stock volatility and banks with high stock volatility. Low and high stock volatility are 
defined as below and above the median stock volatility, respectively. Real estate loans are measured as a ratio to total assets. Vega, 
delta, and cash compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars. Tier 1 and risk-
based capital ratios are a bank’s Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its total risk-weighted assets. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report 
results for banks with low stock volatility, and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report for banks with high stock volatility. The capital 
ratio used in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) is Tier 1 capital ratio, and that in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) is the risk-based capital ratio. 
Year fixed effects are not included in columns (1)-(4) but included in columns (5)-(8). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% 
level. 
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 Real Estate Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Vega -0.000130 0.000121** -0.000120 0.000114** -0.000138 0.000125** -0.000119 0.000116** 
 
(-1.52) (3.01) (-1.41) (2.73) (-1.56) (3.02) (-1.33) (2.70) 
Delta -0.0000101* 0.000000818 -0.00000909 0.000000484 -0.00000885 0.000000805 -0.00000829 0.000000537 
 
(-2.09) (0.44) (-1.95) (0.26) (-1.78) (0.43) (-1.73) (0.28) 
Cash compensation -0.00000117 -0.00000252 -0.00000324 -0.00000279 -0.00000137 -0.00000211 -0.00000315 -0.00000224 
 
(-0.35) (-1.23) (-0.94) (-1.32) (-0.40) (-1.00) (-0.89) (-1.03) 
Tenure (years) 0.0411* 0.0139 0.0536** 0.0351 0.0476* 0.0351 0.0613** 0.0561 
 
(2.25) (0.37) (2.84) (0.71) (2.42) (0.87) (3.05) (1.10) 
CRO present -0.0250 0.00329 -0.0159 -0.000138 -0.0693 0.0647 -0.0683 0.0451 
 
(-1.43) (0.17) (-0.90) (-0.01) (-1.88) (1.37) (-1.75) (0.91) 
Log (total assets) -0.0105 -0.0342*** -0.0104 -0.0312*** -0.00949 -0.0348*** -0.00976 -0.0318*** 
 
(-1.43) (-4.22) (-1.38) (-3.70) (-1.24) (-4.19) (-1.25) (-3.70) 
Total loans 0.0267 0.0610 -0.000725 0.0559 0.0129 0.0655 -0.0115 0.0631 
 
(0.66) (1.37) (-0.02) (1.22) (0.31) (1.45) (-0.27) (1.36) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.00398 -0.0163 0.00209 -0.0135 0.00313 -0.0153 0.00155 -0.0125 
 
(0.79) (-1.93) (0.43) (-1.57) (0.61) (-1.79) (0.31) (-1.44) 
Stock volatility 0.00000225 -0.00000114 0.00000373 -0.00000106 0.00000115 -0.00000120 0.00000245 -0.00000118 
 
(0.60) (-0.85) (0.96) (-0.78) (0.30) (-0.87) (0.61) (-0.85) 
Institutional ownership  -0.000770 0.000855 -0.000874 0.000878 -0.000652 0.000675 -0.000589 0.000678 
 
(-0.90) (0.79) (-1.04) (0.79) (-0.73) (0.61) (-0.67) (0.60) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.592 -0.818*** 
  
-0.510 -0.780*** 
  
 
(-1.60) (-5.59) 
  
(-1.35) (-5.23) 
  
Risk-based capital ratio  
  
-1.294*** -0.616*** 
  
-1.246*** -0.599*** 
   
(-5.82) (-6.73) 
  
(-5.45) (-6.42) 
Year fixed-effects  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 334 370 314 343 334 370 314 343 
Adj. R2 0.059 0.147 0.149 0.183 0.051 0.139 0.143 0.179 
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Table 10: Before, During, and After the 2007-09 Financial Crisis 
 
Table 10 reports results from regressions relating a bank’s real estate loans to its CEO vega and capital ratio of three subsample 
periods. The three subsample periods are before the 2007-09 financial crisis (years 2000-2006), during the crisis (years 2007-2009), 
and after the crisis (years 2010-2014). Real estate loans are measured as a ratio to total assets. Vega, delta, and cash compensation are 
measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, and total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars. Tier 1 and risk-based capital ratios are a bank’s 
Tier 1 and risk-based capital to its total risk-weighted assets. Panel A and Panel B use Tier 1 capital ratio and the risk-based capital 
ratio, respectively, in the regressions. In both panels, columns (1) and (4) report results before the crisis, columns (2) and (5) during 
the crisis, and columns (3) and (6) after the crisis. Year fixed effects are not included in columns (1)-(3) but included in columns (4)-
(6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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A. Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
Variable 
Real Estate Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Before During After Before Crisis After 
Vega 0.0000721 -0.0000345 0.000224* 0.0000766 -0.0000336 0.000251** 
 
(1.38) (-0.49) (2.45) (1.42) (-0.48) (2.71) 
Delta 0.000000247 -0.000000857 -0.00000344 0.000000199 -0.00000105 -0.00000339 
 
(0.11) (-0.23) (-1.10) (0.08) (-0.29) (-1.08) 
Cash compensation -0.00000102 -0.00000136 -0.0000112 -0.00000119 -0.00000101 -0.0000124* 
 
(-0.42) (-0.50) (-1.82) (-0.48) (-0.36) (-2.01) 
Tenure (years) 0.0422* 0.0716 0.0138 0.0451* 0.0773 0.0284 
 
(2.09) (1.36) (0.18) (2.15) (1.44) (0.38) 
CRO present 0.0237 0.0371 -0.107 0.0553 0.0379 -0.131 
 
(0.97) (0.37) (-0.64) (0.67) (0.38) (-0.78) 
Log (total assets) -0.0273** -0.0312** -0.0368*** -0.0255** -0.0317** -0.0369*** 
 
(-3.25) (-2.76) (-3.73) (-2.89) (-2.78) (-3.73) 
Total loans 0.0603 -0.0143 0.0279 0.0607 -0.0125 0.0307 
 
(1.28) (-0.19) (0.52) (1.28) (-0.16) (0.58) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0118 -0.000223 -0.00950 -0.00993 -0.0000941 -0.00951 
 
(-1.42) (-0.03) (-1.21) (-1.16) (-0.01) (-1.20) 
Stock volatility -0.00000297 0.00000157 0.000000763 -0.00000323 0.00000154 0.000000908 
 
(-1.60) (0.41) (0.42) (-1.71) (0.40) (0.50) 
Institutional ownership  -0.000104 -0.000593 -0.000480 0.000154 -0.000466 -0.000374 
 
(-0.10) (-0.37) (-0.37) (0.14) (-0.29) (-0.29) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.841*** -0.837** -1.033*** -0.835*** -0.846** -1.029*** 
 
(-4.63) (-3.19) (-3.81) (-4.55) (-3.21) (-3.79) 
Year fixed-effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 264 173 270 264 173 270 
Adj. R2 0.182 0.100 0.154 0.175 0.092 0.155 
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B. Risk-based Capital Ratio 
 
Variable 
Real Estate Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Before During After Before Crisis After 
Vega 0.0000713 -0.0000311 0.000258** 0.0000792 -0.0000353 0.000282** 
 
(1.35) (-0.42) (2.70) (1.44) (-0.47) (2.91) 
Delta 9.06e-08 -0.000000755 -0.00000400 0.000000188 -0.00000103 -0.00000394 
 
(0.04) (-0.21) (-1.30) (0.08) (-0.28) (-1.28) 
Cash compensation -0.00000111 -0.000000935 -0.0000147* -0.00000116 -0.000000603 -0.0000157* 
 
(-0.45) (-0.32) (-2.39) (-0.47) (-0.20) (-2.54) 
Tenure (years) 0.0560* 0.0726 0.0149 0.0578* 0.0799 0.0312 
 
(2.41) (1.38) (0.20) (2.44) (1.49) (0.42) 
CRO present 0.0170 0.0338 -0.0928 0.0426 0.0346 -0.110 
 
(0.66) (0.34) (-0.57) (0.45) (0.35) (-0.67) 
Log (total assets) -0.0268** -0.0314** -0.0305** -0.0254** -0.0313* -0.0305** 
 
(-3.02) (-2.63) (-3.07) (-2.76) (-2.60) (-3.07) 
Total loans 0.0439 -0.00786 0.0103 0.0489 -0.00583 0.0131 
 
(0.89) (-0.10) (0.20) (0.99) (-0.07) (0.25) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0115 0.000115 -0.00980 -0.00910 0.000345 -0.0101 
 
(-1.34) (0.01) (-1.26) (-1.04) (0.04) (-1.29) 
Stock volatility -0.00000299 0.00000148 0.00000103 -0.00000338 0.00000174 0.00000120 
 
(-1.59) (0.37) (0.59) (-1.78) (0.43) (0.68) 
Institutional ownership  -0.000125 -0.000342 -0.000524 0.000172 -0.000212 -0.000438 
 
(-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.41) (0.16) (-0.13) (-0.34) 
Risk-based capital ratio  -0.740*** -0.621*** -0.839*** -0.743*** -0.646*** -0.837***  
(-5.89) (-3.78) (-6.07) (-5.86) (-3.88) (-6.03) 
Year fixed-effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 238 166 256 238 166 256 
Adj. R2 0.228 0.119 0.224 0.226 0.115 0.228 
 
 
